2026 Election Risk Heat Map Methodology and Glossary
Use this page to better understand the research methodology and scoring factors that we use in the 2026 Election Risk Heat Map. You can also explore the Glossary for quick definitions of key terms.
Election Risk Index
The county and state election risk index is our composite score measuring the presence of risk factors within a county, and across an entire state, which create the conditions for election interference to occur. The score combines together all the data points and risk factors discussed below into a comparable metric showing the presence or absence of risk, on scales of 1-100, for both county and state scores.
| Description | Index Score |
| Moderate Risk | 1-20 |
| Elevated Risk | 21-40 |
| High Risk | 41-60 |
| Very High Risk | 61-80 |
| Extreme Risk | 81-100 |
Electoral Competitiveness
We evaluate the following races for the Heat Map:
- U.S. House of Representatives
- U.S. Senate
- Governor
- Secretary of State/Lt. Governor
- Attorney General
- State Supreme Court
- State Legislature
Competition scores are based on ratings for federal and statewide races from the Cook Political Report and Sabato’s Crystal Ball, with additional data from Oath for evaluating state legislative races. When a county has more than one competitive district, the score is applied to the most competitive race within the county. If there is a disagreement in the ratings between sources, we use the source with the most competitive rating.
| Competitiveness Rating | Our Risk Score |
| Toss Up | 5 |
| Lean Democrat/Republican | 3 |
| Likely Democrat/Republican | 2 |
| Solid Democrat/Republican | 1 |
| No Race in 2026 | 0 |
State supreme court races are not typically rated in the same way as other elections, especially for retention elections. For the Heat Map, we used reporting by State Court Report, Sabato’s Crystal Ball, and Cook Political Report to assess the highest impact “priority” races in 2026, along with tracking from Ballotpedia to assess and assign competitiveness scores for state court races.
| Competitiveness Rating | Our Risk Score |
| Identified Priority Race to Watch | 5 |
| Partisan or Nonpartisan Traditional Election | 3 |
| Judicial Retention Race | 1 |
| No Race in 2026 | 0 |
Analysis of State and Local Actors
The tool evaluates the actors involved in the 2026 elections, including the candidates in the races above and the officials with authority over elections at the state and local levels. Secretaries of state, state and county boards of elections, county supervisors, and other state and local actors responsible for determining local election plans and counting, canvassing, and certifying results are included.
Sources evaluated included social media, traditional media reporting, legislative records, meeting minutes, and tracking by States United Action.
Candidates are rated based on the degree to which they meet our definition of an “election denier.”
| Candidate Election Denial Evaluation | Our Risk Score |
| Meets our definition of election denier | 5 |
| Does not qualify as election denier but has exhibited warning signs they may be sympathetic to election disinformation and attempts to interfere with elections. | 3 |
| No identified flags or concerns on the candidate | 1 |
State and local authorities are rated based on whether election deniers serve on the governing body in question.
| Presence of Election Deniers in Office(s) with Election Authority | Our Risk Score |
| Individual or individuals present meet our definition of election denier | 5 |
| Individual or individuals do not qualify as election deniers but have exhibited warning signs | 3 |
| No identified flags or concerns on currently serving individuals, but the locality has seen historic interference attempts or certification refusals | 1 |
| Research has produced no substantive findings | 0 |
Election Denier Definition
An “election denier” is an individual who seeks to undermine faith in past election outcomes by denying their legitimacy or is actively seeking to undermine the outcome of or confidence in free and fair democratic elections.
To qualify as an election denier, a candidate or sitting official must meet one or more of the criteria below. An election denier is someone who has:
- Falsely claimed former President Trump won the 2020 presidential election instead of the legitimate winner, President Biden;
- Spread false or erroneous information, promoted conspiracies, or otherwise undermined confidence about the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election or subsequent election cycles in public, including in an official capacity, through social media, in press statements, or comments to the press;
- Refused to carry out official election administration duties, including certification, or called on or pressured election officials to refuse to carry out official election administration duties, in the 2020 presidential election or in subsequent elections, based on meritless claims about election fraud, voter fraud, inaccurate results, misinformation, or false or erroneous information;
- Taken action to undermine the integrity of the 2020 presidential election or in subsequent election cycles, including:
- Filing or supporting litigation seeking to overturn the results based on false or erroneous information or baseless legal theories;
- Filing or supporting litigation that was sanctioned for being malicious or without merit in the aftermath of an election;
- Promoting or participating in a Stop the Steal–sponsored or branded event or rally during or following the 2020 election or subsequent elections;
- Calling for a “forensic audit” of the 2020 presidential election or a race in subsequent elections after the results were certified, were officially audited, or stood up to multiple legal challenges;
- Acted in an official capacity to undermine or impede the administration of free and fair elections, including through rulemaking or decision-making explicitly designed for partisan advantage, or through platforming election deniers in official settings for the purpose of undermining faith in the integrity of elections;
- Refused to concede a race, or publicly supported a candidate’s refusal to concede a race, after the results were officially audited or stood up to multiple legal challenges;
- Coordinated inappropriately with federal or state government efforts to interfere with state or local election administration unlawfully;
- Participated in, amplified, or otherwise supported organized advocacy efforts working to undermine faith in elections, through the guise of “election integrity” and other such misleading terminology.
State Policy Assessment
Each state’s law and policy environment is evaluated on a series of 12 key indicators that contribute to or mitigate the risk of election interference. The presence of vulnerabilities in state law and processes — from the language of relevant statutes to their absence — is a key factor to consider when determining overarching risk.
Our state policy assessment is based on the following questions:
- Does the state offer either online voter registration or automatic voter registration to assist with keeping rolls up to date?
- Does the state allow eligible voters to register for all elections without providing documentary proof of citizenship, such as a passport or birth certificate?
- Does state law provide adequate protections against mass voter registration challenges?
- Does state law provide adequate safeguards for voter challenges at polling locations?
- Does state law provide clear rules concerning the availability of ballot drop boxes and cure?
- Does the state publicly test tabulation equipment before and after Election Day?
- Does the state allow election officials to pre-process mail ballots prior to Election Day?
- Does state law make local certification explicitly non-discretionary?
- Does state law require all jurisdictions to perform pre-certification audits to verify results?
- Does state law contain sufficient remedies should a locality refuse to certify?
- Does state law provide adequate safeguards and limitations on post-election judicial challenges?
- Does state law set deadlines on the resolution of post-election judicial challenges that avoid delays in elected officials taking office?
Each “no” earns a state 1 point. Scores are then rescaled to a 1-10 risk ranking. This policy assessment covers only the policies that have been implemented and will be in effect for the 2026 elections.
| State Policy Assessment Score | Our Description |
| 7-10 | Very High Vulnerability |
| 4-6 | High Vulnerability |
| 1-3 | Moderate Vulnerability |
State Litigation Environment
Each state’s litigation environment is evaluated based on the frequency and volume of election-related litigation, as reported by Democracy Docket during the 2024 election cycle, on a 1-5 scale.
| Volume of Election Litigation | Our Risk Score | Our Description |
| 20+ election policy lawsuits | 5 | High Litigation Activity |
| 10-19 election policy lawsuits | 3 | Moderate Litigation Activity |
| 1-9 election policy lawsuits | 1 | Limited Litigation Activity |
| No known election policy lawsuits | 0 | No Litigation Activity |
Vote By Mail
State and county data are evaluated for vote by mail popularity and use during the most recent midterm election cycle, in 2022. As a popular target for conspiracies and disinformation regarding election security, counties are assigned a risk score based on the percentage of voters participating by mail, broken down into quintiles. The greater the percentage of voters voting by mail, the higher the risk factor becomes.
| Percentage of Voters Using Mail | Our Risk Score |
| >90% | 5 |
| 61-90% | 4 |
| 31-60% | 3 |
| 1-30% | 2 |
| <1% | 1 |
In Alaska, where jurisdiction-level data is unavailable, we substitute the national average score across all jurisdictions with available data. This approach prevents missing data from artificially inflating or depressing Alaska’s overall risk score.
Additionally, because Wisconsin reports some ballots through jurisdictions that span multiple counties, we apportioned those votes to individual counties based on the proportion of the jurisdiction’s registered voters residing in each county, as calculated from a recent version of the Wisconsin voter file.
2024 Counting Duration
The 2024 Counting Duration Score measures how long it takes election officials to count ballots after polls close. We calculate the number of hours required to reach 75%, 90%, and 99% of ballots counted. We then combine these three measures into a single score using principal component analysis and rescale the result to a 0-5 range. Averages and score ranges are calculated across all U.S. jurisdictions for which data is available.
Where jurisdiction-level data is unavailable (largely Alaska and New Hampshire), we substitute the national average score across all jurisdictions with available data. This approach prevents missing data from artificially inflating or depressing those jurisdictions’ overall risk score.
The total hours displayed in the Data Details section for each county identify the number of hours it took the county to count 95% of all votes in the 2024 general election.
| 2024 Counting Duration Score | Our Description |
| 0-0.46 | Well Below Average |
| 0.46-1.09 | Below Average |
| 1.09-1.36 | Above Average |
| 1.36+ | Well Above Average |
Population Vulnerability Assessment
The Population Vulnerability Score is constructed from four county-level indicators: the share of the population that is foreign-born, non-native English-speaking, noncitizen, and non-white. The first principal component is extracted and rescaled to a 0-5 range. Averages and score ranges are calculated across all U.S. jurisdictions for which data is available.
| Population Vulnerability Score | Our Description |
| 0-0.24 | Well Below Average |
| 0.24-0.69 | Below Average |
| 0.69-0.90 | Above Average |
| 0.90+ | Well Above Average |
Anti-Democracy Statewide Infrastructure
States are evaluated for the presence of organized anti-democratic activist networks that have worked to sow doubt about American elections, spread conspiracies about election integrity, or otherwise undermine elections, interfere with nonpartisan election administration, or challenge verified election results. Groups were identified through the Election Integrity Network and American Oversight’s 2024 tracking.
| Number of Organizations Present and Active | Our Risk Score |
| 12-13 organized anti-democratic activist groups | 5 |
| 9-11 organized anti-democratic activist groups | 4 |
| 6-8 organized anti-democratic activist groups | 3 |
| 3-5 organized anti-democratic activist groups | 2 |
| 1-2 organized anti-democratic activist groups | 1 |
Federal Interference: State Voter Roll Sharing
Each state has been evaluated to determine whether state election officials shared full, unredacted voter lists with the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security to assess and track the risk of federal intervention in state list maintenance processes, as assessed by the Brennan Center for Justice and media coverage.
Multiple counties have experienced direct, overt federal intervention in election administration, including the seizure of 2020 election materials by federal agents, as in Fulton County, Georgia; Maricopa County Arizona; and Wayne County, Michigan. These counties are acknowledged with an additional 5 points applied to indicate overt intervention.
| Cooperation with DOJ and/or DHS | Our Risk Score |
| The DOJ has sued the state over voters lists and the county has been the target of overt intervention | 6 |
| State shared full, unredacted voter lists | 3 |
| The DOJ has sued the state over voter lists | 1 |
| No noted intervention | 0 |
Federal Interference: ICE Presence
Each county has been evaluated based on three factors: whether it currently hosts an ICE office, has been identified as a location for future ICE expansion according to agency records or reporting by Wired, or contains a law enforcement agency operating under a Section 287(g) agreement with ICE. These Section 287(g) agreements authorize local officers to perform specified immigration enforcement functions under ICE’s supervision and oversight.
| Formal ICE Relationship | Our Risk Score |
| ICE office or 287(g) agreement in place | 2 |
| No formal ICE presence or relationship | 0 |
Updates and Corrections
We are committed to regularly updating our research and the data reflected in this tool to ensure accuracy. We are scanning for competition rating changes every two weeks, and refreshing candidate assessments following primary elections in each state and as additional information becomes available.
If you believe that we are using outdated, incorrect or incomplete information, please let us know via email at heatmap@votingrightslab.org.
Glossary
This glossary defines the key terms, scores, and concepts used throughout the 2026 Election Risk Heat Map. Use it as a reference to better understand the methodology, risk factors, and election administration concepts that inform our analysis.
Key Terms
| Term | Definition |
| Election Risk Index | Our composite score measuring the presence of risk factors within a county which create the conditions for election-interference to occur. |
| Statewide Election Risk Index | Our composite score measuring election-related risk factors across an entire state. |
| Electoral Competitiveness | A measure of how competitive a race is expected to be based on ratings from election forecasters. |
| Election Denier | An “election denier” is an individual who seeks to undermine faith in past election outcomes by denying their legitimacy or is actively seeking to undermine the outcome of or confidence in free and fair democratic elections. Our complete definition is available in the Methodology. |
| Warning Signs | Public statements, actions, or affiliations that may indicate sympathy toward election disinformation, anti-democratic conduct, or efforts to undermine election administration, but do not meet our full definition of election denial. |
| Historic Concerns | A history of election administration disputes, certification refusals, or election interference attempts within a jurisdiction, separate from any concerns regarding current officeholders. |
| Anti-democratic | Actions or conduct by organized groups or individuals that undermine democratic institutions, election administration, or public confidence in election outcomes. |
| State Election Authority | A statewide official or governing body responsible for administering elections and certifying results. These officials include the chief elections officer, secretaries of state, and members of state boards of elections. |
| Local Election Authority | A local official or governing body responsible for election administration, vote counting, canvassing, or certification. These officials include members of boards of elections, county supervisors, elections directors or clerks. |
Key Risk Factors
| Term | Definition |
| State Policy Assessment | A 12-point evaluation of state election laws and procedures that may increase or reduce vulnerability to election interference. |
| State Litigation Environment | A measure of the frequency and volume of election-related litigation within a state during the 2024 election cycle. |
| Vote by Mail (VBM) | A voting method that allows voters to cast ballots through the mail rather than in person. |
| Vote by Mail Score | A score based on the percentage of voters who cast ballots by mail during the 2022 election cycle. |
| Counting Duration Score | A comparative measure of how long it took to count ballots within a jurisdiction in the 2024 general election. |
| Population Vulnerability Score | A measure based on demographic characteristics that may make a population more vulnerable to voter suppression, intimidation, or election-related targeting. |
| Anti-Democracy Statewide Infrastructure | The presence of organized groups within a state that have worked to undermine confidence in elections or interfere with nonpartisan election administration. |
Elections & Competitiveness
| Term | Definition |
| U.S. House Rating | An assessment of the competitiveness of a congressional race. If a county contains multiple House districts, the score is based on the most competitive district race. |
| U.S. Senate Race Rating | An assessment of the competitiveness of a U.S. Senate race. |
| Governor Race Rating | An assessment of the competitiveness of a gubernatorial race. |
| Secretary of State Race Rating | An assessment of the competitiveness of a state’s secretary of state election. |
| State Court Race Rating | An assessment of the significance of a state supreme court election, based on whether the race is a priority contest, a partisan or nonpartisan election, or a retention election. |
| Attorney General Race Rating | An assessment of the competitiveness of a state’s attorney general election. |
| State Legislative Race Rating | An assessment of the competitiveness of state legislative elections represented within a county. If a county contains multiple legislative districts, the score is based on the most competitive district race. |
Federal Interference
| Term | Definition |
| Federal Interference | The extent to which federal agencies or actors have been involved in the administration or disruption of state or local elections. |
| State Voter Roll Sharing | The sharing of voter registration data with federal agencies such as the Department of Justice or Department of Homeland Security, often as the result of federally-initiated litigation. |
| ICE Presence | The presence of an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office or formal law enforcement partnership with ICE within a county. |
| Section 287g Agreements | A formal agreement allowing local law enforcement agencies to perform certain immigration enforcement functions under ICE supervision. |
| Eligible Voter Population | The estimated number of residents within a jurisdiction who are eligible to vote under federal and state law, based on Census data. |
| Election Interference | Attempts to improperly influence, disrupt, delay, manipulate, or undermine election administration or election outcomes. |
| Election Crisis | A situation in which election results, administration, or certification become subject to significant dispute, disruption, or disinformation. |
State Policy Vulnerabilities
| Term | Definition |
| Lacks Automated Registration System | The state does not provide online voter registration, automatic voter registration, or both, making it more difficult to keep voter registration records accurate and up to date. |
| Requires Proof of Citizenship | The state requires documentary proof of citizenship, such as a passport or birth certificate, to register to vote, creating additional opportunities for voter eligibility disputes and election-related litigation. |
| Lacks Mass Registration Challenge Protections | The state does not provide adequate safeguards against large-scale voter registration challenges that may improperly remove eligible voters from the voter rolls. |
| Lacks Polling Place Challenge Protections | The state does not provide sufficient protections against improper challenges to a voter’s eligibility at a polling place. |
| Lacks Ballot Return Clarity | The state does not clearly define ballot return options, such as ballot drop boxes, or establish clear procedures allowing voters to correct ballot errors through ballot cure processes. |
| Lacks Public Equipment Testing | The state does not require public testing of voting equipment before and after elections to verify accuracy and proper operation. |
| Lacks Mail Ballot Pre-Processing | The state does not allow election officials to verify and prepare mail ballots for counting before Election Day, which can delay results reporting. |
| Lacks Non-Discretionary Certification | The state does not clearly require election officials to certify election results once legal requirements have been satisfied, creating opportunities for delays or refusals. |
| Lacks Pre-Certification Audits | The state does not require jurisdictions to conduct audits or other verification procedures before election results are certified, limiting opportunities for independent verification before results become official. |
| Lacks Non-Certification Remedies | The state does not provide clear legal mechanisms for resolving situations in which election officials refuse to certify election results. |
| Lacks Post-Election Challenge Safeguards | The state does not adequately limit or regulate post-election legal challenges, increasing the potential for frivolous or disruptive litigation. |
| Lacks Post-Election Challenge Deadlines | The state does not establish deadlines for resolving post-election legal challenges, increasing the potential for prolonged uncertainty or delays in elected officials taking office. |
Election Administration & Security
| Term | Definition |
| Election Administration | The process of conducting elections, including voter registration, ballot processing, vote tabulation, certification, and oversight. |
| Election Certification | The official process by which election results are finalized and confirmed. This precise process varies by jurisdiction. |
| Ballot Cure | A process that allows voters to correct errors or omissions on a ballot so it can be counted. |
| Ballot Drop Box | A secure location where voters can return completed mail ballots. |
| Public Equipment Testing | Testing of voting equipment before and after elections to verify accuracy and proper operation. |
| Mail Ballot Pre-Processing | The verification and preparation of mail ballots before Election Day so they can be tabulated more efficiently once polls close. |
| Election Audit | A review conducted after an election to verify the accuracy of reported results. |
| Risk Limiting Audit | A statistical audit designed to confirm election outcomes by manually reviewing a sample of ballots. |
| Pre-Certification Audit | A review conducted before certification to verify the accuracy of election results. |
| Post-Election Judicial Challenge | A lawsuit filed after an election seeking to contest election procedures, administration, or results. |
Voter Registration & Eligibility
| Term | Definition |
| Automatic Voter Registration | A system that automatically registers eligible citizens to vote when they interact with certain government agencies unless they decline registration. |
| Online Voter Registration | A system that allows eligible voters to register or update their registration online. |
| Documentary Proof of Citizenship | A requirement that voters provide documents such as passports, birth certificates, or naturalization papers to prove citizenship when registering to vote. |
| Mass Voter Registration Challenge | An effort to challenge the registration status of large numbers of voters at once. |
| Polling Place Challenge | A challenge to a voter’s eligibility made at or near a polling place before a ballot is cast. |
| Eligible Voter Population | The estimated number of residents within a jurisdiction who are eligible to register and vote under federal and state law, based on Census data. |