

The For The People Act

H.R.1/S.1 protects our freedom to vote

Better in-person voting

On Election Day for the 2020 general election, around 30% of likely voters took at least 30 minutes to vote. About 15% (more than 8 million voters) took an hour or more. Voters of color are three times more likely to wait more than 30 minutes and six times more likely to wait more than an hour to vote.¹

Through H.R.1/S.1, no voter will have to wait more than 30 minutes to vote in person.


17 states and the District of Columbia had fewer in-person polling locations in 2016 compared to 2012.² These closures were most heavily clustered in Black, Latinx, and Native American communities.³

Counties will need to give their voters at least seven days notice about polling place changes if H.R.1/S.1 passes.

2020 GENERAL ELECTION VOTING TIMES



VOTERS OF COLOR




FEWER POLLING LOCATIONS



Expanded early voting

For many, including those who work full time or have family commitments, it can be difficult to vote on Election Day. But in 2018, nearly 60 million eligible Americans lived in one of the 12 states without any form of early voting.⁴

If H.R.1/S.1 is passed, voters in all states will have the opportunity to vote early in person for at least 15 consecutive days.



Currently, only 18 states require a minimum of 15 days of early voting.⁵ One study estimated that 15 days of early voting will increase turnout by 3.3% (over no early voting).⁶

Improved absentee voting



Nearly 1 in 3 (or 77 million) eligible voters live in one of the 16 states that bar them from voting by mail unless they provide an excuse.⁷

H.R.1/S.1 would ensure that voters in all states can choose to vote absentee without an excuse.

10,000



VOTES THROWN AWAY

12 states require voters to have their ballots witnessed or even notarized, often for a fee.⁸ In those states, more than 10,000 votes are thrown away each presidential election due to a missing witness signature.⁹

H.R.1/S.1 ensures that voters can cast their absentee ballot without paying or compromising their privacy.

Absentee ballots are rejected at twice the rate of ballots cast in person.¹⁰ The majority are rejected for signature issues, and the ballots of voters of color are disproportionately rejected.¹¹ But only 23 states have a statewide cure process that allows voters to fix issues on their ballot so that their vote can be counted.¹²

H.R.1/S.1 ensures that voters are notified and given an opportunity to fix any small issues so that their voices can be heard and their votes counted.



22%

**OF BALLOTS OR ABOUT
14,000,000
BALLOTS RETURNED
IN DROP BOXES**

In a 2020 study, 22% of mail ballots were returned in a drop box – that's over 14 million ballots.¹³

Through H.R.1/S.1, voters in all counties will have the ability to return their ballot safely at secure drop off locations.

H.R.1/S.1 builds confidence in the integrity of our elections

Standardized ballot tracking



In a recent survey, 83% of voters showed support for online tracking systems for absentee ballots.¹⁴ A system of electronic ballot tracking would allow voters to know the status of their ballot at any time, from the time election officials mail it out, to the time the voter returns it,

all the way until it's verified and counted. But nearly 40 million voters did not have ballot tracking available to them in the 2020 election.¹⁵

H.R.1/S.1 would grant money to states to improve ballot tracking so that voters can have confidence that their vote was counted.

Required paper ballots

Counties in eight states (Texas, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky and New Jersey) exclusively use paperless machines. In 2020, an estimated 16 million voters use paperless ballots that cannot be audited to verify the accuracy of results.¹⁶ 90% of voters support conducting election audits to ensure voting machines worked properly and votes were counted accurately.¹⁷




90%

**OF VOTERS SUPPORT
ELECTION AUDITS**

Under H.R.1/S.1, states would be required to use paper ballots suitable for a manual audit or recount so that we can trust in the results of our elections.

Stronger election infrastructure



More than 80% of voting machines in use today come from three private election vendors, but there are no federal safeguards for these companies to prevent an attack. A successful cyberattack against any of these companies could have devastating consequences to our elections.¹⁸

H.R.1/S.1 would create new safeguards against threats to our election infrastructure so that Americans can trust the results are accurate.

H.R.1/S.1 makes our elections more fair and transparent

Independent redistricting

In the U.S., it's the voters who decide who represents them, leaders shouldn't get to pick their voters. But in some states, one political party has sole control of redistricting, and they draw the lines to benefit their own elections. That leads to unfairly drawn, partisan districts. After the last round of redistricting in 2010, 4.4 million voters from both parties were disenfranchised due to partisan-controlled map drawing.¹⁹

H.R.1/S.1 creates fair redistricting criteria and independent redistricting commissions to ensure that our elected leaders reflect the people they serve.

Campaign finance transparency

Nearly \$1 billion in secret money, known as "dark money," has been spent on U.S. elections over the past decade. The true sources of dark money used to influence our elections are not publicly disclosed, so we do not know how much may have come from foreign sources.²⁰



**"DARK MONEY"
SPENT ON U.S.
ELECTIONS**

H.R.1/S.1 would overhaul campaign finance laws so voters know who is spending money to influence our elections.

Endnotes

- 1 Kevin Quealy and Alicia Parlapiano, “Election Day Voting in 2020 Took Longer in America’s Poorest Neighborhoods”, The Upshot, New York Times, accessed online on February 8, 2021 at <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/04/upshot/voting-wait-times.html>; Pettigrew, Stephen. “The racial gap in wait times: why minority precincts are underserved by local election officials.” *Political Science Quarterly* 132, no. 3 (2017): 527-547. To estimate numbers of voters affected, we use data from the U.S. Elections Project on total ballots cast subtracting early votes cast, accessed online at <http://www.electproject.org/2020g> and <https://electproject.github.io/Early-Vote-2020G/index.html>, respectively.
- 2 Christopher Ingraham, “Analysis: Thousands of Polling Places Were Closed over the Past Decade. Here’s Where.” Washington Post, accessed on July 6, 2020, available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/26/thousands-polling-places-were-closed-over-past-decade-heres-where/>.
- 3 “Polling Places in Black Communities Continue to Close Ahead of November Elections,” accessed on July 6, 2020, available at <https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/sl-polling-place-close-ahead-of-november-elections-black-voters.html>.
- 4 This figure is the sum of the Voting Eligible Population (VEP) in Alabama, Connecticut, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia. Estimates of the VEP are from the U.S. Elections Project, Updated November 7, 2020, “2020 General Election Turnout Rates”, data accessed on February 12, 2021, at <http://www.electproject.org/2020g>.
- 5 Voting Rights Lab State Voting Rights Tracker - Early Voting: <https://tracker.votingrightslab.org/issues/21ErlyVtngAvlbtly>
- 6 Kaplan, Ethan, and Haishan Yuan. “Early voting laws, voter turnout, and partisan vote composition: Evidence from Ohio.” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 12, no. 1 (2020): 32-60.
- 7 This figure is the sum of the Voting Eligible Population (VEP) in Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia. Estimates of the VEP are from the U.S. Elections Project, Updated November 7, 2020, “2020 General Election Turnout Rates”, data accessed on February 12, 2021, at <http://www.electproject.org/2020g>.
- 8 VRL 50-State Absentee Ballot Verification Survey, January 2021: <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1HhDME0cbXuqvjW2dpdD9yNli6iX8J3lvNqA9rSxYpOk/edit?usp=sharing>
- 9 Estimates are from analysis of data obtained from tables in the 2016 and 2018 U.S. Election Commission Election Administration and Voting Survey Reports, accessed online on February 12, 2021 at <https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/studies-and-reports>.
- 10 VRL analysis of 2016 and 2018 EAVS data comparing the rejection rates of ballots cast by mail and ballots cast in person defined as the number of rejected provisional ballots over the number of ballots cast in person. Estimates of ballots cast and rejected by mail and in person obtained from tables in the 2016 and 2018 U.S. Election Commission Election Administration and Voting Survey Reports, accessed online on February 12, 2021 at <https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/studies-and-reports>.
- 11 Mark Nichols, Soo Rin Kim, and Ivan Pereira, “750,000 mail-in ballots were rejected in 2016 and 2018. Here’s why that matters.” ABC News, accessed online at <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/750000-mail-ballots-rejected-2016-2018-matters/story?id=73645323>. See also, Shino, Enrijeta, Mara Suttman-Lea and Daniel A. Smith Baringer, May 21, 2020, “Here’s the problem with mail-in ballots: They might not be counted. That’s especially true for younger, minority and first-time voters.” Washington Post, accessed online on February 12, 2021 at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/21/heres-problem-with-mail-in-ballots-they-might-not-be-counted/> and Anna, Michael C. Herron, and Daniel A. Smith. “Voting by Mail and Ballot Rejection: Lessons from Florida for Elections in the Age of the Coronavirus.” *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy* 19, no. 3 (2020): 289-320 available at <https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/ELJ.2020.0658>.
- 12 Voting Rights Lab State Voting Rights Tracker - Absentee Voting: <https://tracker.votingrightslab.org/issues/21AbsenteeVtg>
- 13 Stewart, Charles III. December 15, 2020, “How We Voted in 2020: A First Look at the Survey of the Performance of American Elections, Version 0.1”, M.I.T. Election Data Science Lab, accessed on February 8, 2020 at <http://electionlab.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2020-12/How-we-voted-in-2020-v01.pdf>.
- 14 “New Survey Reveals Broad Support for Pro-Voter Policy Changes”, accessed online at https://votingrightslab.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Voting-Rights-Lab-S360-Policy-Survey-Memo_State.pdf
- 15 U.S. Elections Project, 2020 General Election Turnout, accessed online at <http://www.electproject.org/2020g>
- 16 Miller Maggie, August 13, 2019, “Report says eight states to use paperless voting in 2020 despite security concerns”, The Hill, accessed online at <https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/457168-report-says-eight-states-to-use-paperless-voting-in-2020-despite>
- 17 “New Survey Reveals Broad Support for Pro-Voter Policy Changes”, accessed online at https://votingrightslab.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Voting-Rights-Lab-S360-Policy-Survey-Memo_State.pdf
- 18 Howard, Elizabeth, January 9, 2020, “Congressional Testimony: 2020 Election Security and Election Vendors”, Brennan Center For Justice, accessed online on February 12, 2021 at <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/congressional-testimony-2020-election-security-and-election-vendors> and Zetter, Kim, September 26, 2018, “The Crisis of Election Security”, New York Times Magazine, accessed online at <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/magazine/election-security-crisis-midterms.html>.
- 19 Wang, Sam. 2013, “Gerrymanders, Part 2: How many voters were disenfranchised?” accessed on February 8, 2021 at <https://election.princeton.edu/2013/01/02/gerrymanders-part-2-how-many-voters-were-disenfranchised/>.
- 20 Campaign Legal Center, “Combatting Foreign Interference”, Undated, accessed on February 8, 2021 at <https://campaignlegal.org/democracy/transparency/combatting-foreign-interference>.